14 Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, But Not Gone

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The six years following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11) witnessed exponential growth of an industry of security professionals, academics, and policy makers who sought to understand, prevent, deter, and disrupt future terrorist acts undertaken by international terrorist groups.\(^1\) The overwhelming majority of those who flocked to counterterrorism after 9/11 believe those horrific attacks to be a defining moment in the history of terrorism. Shaped in part by the international dimension of those attacks, the conventional wisdom among many policy makers, academics, security professionals, and some members of the Intelligence Community holds that the primary terrorist threat to the United States comes from al-Qa’ida, Sunni terrorist groups allied with it, and other international terrorist groups motivated by a vehement hatred of the United States.\(^2\)

We acknowledge that al-Qa’ida, its allies, and other international terrorist groups pose a significant threat to U.S. national security and will, in all likelihood, continue to remain a threat well into the future.\(^3\) We argue here, however, that the nearly one-dimensional focus on international terrorism by policy makers, academics, the intelligence services, and, to a much lesser extent, local, state, and federal law-enforcement agencies provides an incomplete picture of the terrorist threat. It also does little to advance our overall understanding of the very real threat that domestic terrorists pose and the special challenges that such individuals and groups present for the intelligence and law enforcement communities. In simple terms, we believe that domestic terrorism has become the proverbial stepchild in counterterrorism preparedness even though a number of domestic terrorist groups continue to operate in the United States\(^4\) and, historically, have conducted lethal attacks against a wide variety of targets. U.S. citizens having no connection or affiliation with international terrorist groups or their agendas have demonstrated that they are as capable and willing to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States on a scale equivalent to attacks that could be conducted by international

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terrorists. In the balance of this chapter, we use historical examples to illustrate the fact that domestic terrorists have been and can be just as deadly as international terrorists. We also suggest that the perception of international terrorists being more nefarious has resulted in a dearth of academic literature on domestic terrorism. Finally, we advance the idea that the goal of new antiterrorism federal legislation post-9/11, such as the Patriot Act, was squarely focused on the international threat.

Many contend that the 9/11 attacks are a defining moment in the history of terrorism in the United States. The attacks gave rise to a notion that a new era of terrorism had been unleashed, chiefly characterized by mass civilian casualties, and directed against symbolic and economic targets. Hand in hand with the desire to inflict mass casualties, the attacks raised the specter that international terrorists would obtain and use a weapon of mass destruction. However, scrutiny of past incidents committed by domestic terrorists, who are characterized as U.S. citizens acting against U.S. interests within the United States, indicates that with the exception of the high number of casualties, the 2001 attacks are no different than prior terrorist activity by U.S. citizens. What may come as a surprise to some readers is the fact that well prior to 2001, domestic terrorists had already successfully attacked strikingly similar targets to those that were attacked on 9/11.

Eighty-one years earlier, on 16 September 1920 a group calling itself the American Anarchist Fighters placed a bomb in a horse cart and left it on Wall Street in New York City. When the bomb detonated it indiscriminately killed 30 and injured 300. Ten others later died of their injuries. The American Anarchist Fighters undoubtedly chose to target Wall Street for the same reasons as did al-Qa’ida. To the anarchists, Wall Street was a symbol of the financial, economic, and imperialist power of the United States and was a symbol known worldwide. In 1954, extremists associated with the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, considered then to be domestic terrorists by the FBI, opened fire in the gallery of the United States House of Representatives, wounding five members of Congress. This attack occurred 47 years before United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a Pennsylvania field before it could destroy the apparent target—the U.S. Capitol. The Puerto Rican separatists’ ultimate goal then, as it remains to this day, was independence from what they perceived as the U.S. imperialist governance of the island. The United States Senate has not been spared terrorist attacks, having been bombed twice by left-wing domestic terrorists. In 1971 and 1983 separate left-wing groups placed bombs in the Senate that caused damage but no injuries or deaths. Three decades before the terrorist hijackers aboard American Airlines Flight 77 set their sights on the Pentagon, the Weather Underground, a particularly violent left-wing group believed to have been responsible for over 30 bombings, placed a bomb in a Pentagon bathroom to protest military action in Vietnam and to pressure the United States to withdraw its troops from that country. Fundamentally, the Weather Underground viewed the Pentagon as the enforcer of the country’s unjust foreign policy. While both domestic terrorists and al-Qa’ida’s ultimate overall political objectives were different in these instances, they selected targets for the same reasons. Each sought to strike at the symbols of America’s financial, military, and political might.
THE Misperception That Domestic Terrorists Are Less Lethal

There is a perception that international terrorists are more diabolical than domestic terrorists. That perception appears to be driven by three main presumptions. First, many contend that international terrorists, particularly those associated with radical Islam, are inherently dangerous due to their religious zealotry. Second, many believe that international terrorists pose a greater danger to U.S. national security because some groups seek to obtain and use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, international groups are viewed as more dangerous because they seek to cause indiscriminate mass casualties, often by focusing their attacks against relatively unprotected critical infrastructure. There is little doubt that all of these contentions ring true for some international terrorists, particularly al-Qa’ida and similarly motivated groups. However, a review of terrorism that has taken place in the United States over the past century shows that domestic terrorists have already beaten international groups to the punch on each of these counts.

Terrorist groups are generally categorized as politically motivated, religiously motivated, or single interest, i.e., those driven by one particular goal. While achieving a political or social goal is a fundamental motivator of all three groups, those driven by a religious imperative are often viewed as the most unpredictable. To members of such groups, religious “ends” almost exclusively justify their means to achieve them. Radical Islamic groups have been held up as the prime examples of religiously motivated terrorism and many contend that they pose the greatest danger to the United States. Yet the United States has a host of domestically based religiously motivated terrorist groups, all of whom essentially believe that the world is on the verge of a final apocalyptic race war between God’s chosen people and Satan’s allies, which include the U.S. government.

Like radical Islamists, many adherents of these racist religions, which hold both white-supremacist and black-supremacist views, believe that they have been chosen by God to alter society in a manner consistent with their theological beliefs and, just like many jihadists, believe that in order to get to their versions of heaven, they must die in a battle against their oppressors. For example, some adherents of the white-supremacist Christian Identity ideology refer to themselves as Phineas Priests. They interpret the biblical example of Phinehas to justify killing in defense of their interpretation of God’s laws, which condemns race mixing, homosexuality, the banking system, and abortion. There are multiple examples of terrorist activity based on these beliefs. Joseph Paul Franklin, a Phineas Priest, killed at least 11 individuals who were in mixed-race relationships. He also attempted to murder civil rights leader Vernon Jordan and Larry Flynt, the publisher of *Hustler* magazine. In 1996, a group of Phineas Priests, dubbed the Spokane Bank Robbers, placed bombs at an abortion clinic and the offices of a newspaper in separate incidents in Spokane, Washington. After each bombing they robbed a bank. Eric Rudolph, who placed a bomb at the 1996 Olympics, and later at two abortion clinics and a homosexual nightclub, killing a total of two people, is noteworthy. He spent time at a Christian Identity compound during his formative years. But, at the time of his bombings, he appears to have become aligned with the Army of God, whose chief goal is to end abortion, not to achieve a state of white supremacy. Almost uniformly those associated with the Army of God are not white supremacists; rather they are influenced by...
their unique interpretation of Christianity. Although he claimed the Olympic Park bombings on behalf of the Army of God, not in the name of Christian Identity, the locations of the bombings and the letter he wrote taking claim for them reflects the religiously based targets associated with both Christian Identity and the Army of God.

Like some radical Islamists, a few adherents to the Odinist religion contend that salvation and immortality can only be obtained by dying in a race war. In the early 1980s, Odinist Bob Mathews led the Order, which engaged in bank robberies, murder, and bombings with the goal of creating a “whites only” homeland in the northwestern United States. After evading FBI agents in a gun battle, he wrote, “I have been a good soldier, a fearless warrior. I will die with honor and join my brothers in [heaven].” Matthews’s martyrdom ideology led to his death in 1984, when he died during a standoff with federal agents. Another Odinist, John William King, killed James Byrd, Jr., an African American, by dragging Byrd behind King’s car. King was content with the belief that he might be sentenced to death for his actions.

Perhaps the worst imaginable terrorism incident involves the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weaponry. There is little doubt that Usama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida seek to obtain such weaponry. Significantly, the desire is just as strong for some domestic groups. Individuals with ties to domestic terrorist groups have already demonstrated a capability to produce and employ CBRN weapons. For example, in June 2004, Michael Crooker, an antigovernment extremist living in rural Massachusetts, was arrested on charges relating to his illegal transportation of a firearm. During the search of his apartment, items found indicated that Crooker was successfully manufacturing ricin, a highly lethal biological weapon made from castor beans. Ricin is one of the most toxic and easily produced plant toxins. When inhaled as a respiratory aerosol, ricin causes severe tissue damage of the airways and may result in death. Crooker’s manufacture and intended use of ricin is hardly a new or isolated incident involving a domestic individual with extremist views. In November 1999, the FBI arrested James Kenneth Gluck for threatening to kill judges in Jefferson County, Colorado, through the use of biological weapons. A search of Gluck’s residence discovered a makeshift laboratory, the necessary ingredients to make ricin, and a copy of the Anarchist’s Cookbook. In March 1998, three members of the North American Militia in Michigan were arrested on weapons and conspiracy charges. In searching the homes of these men, federal authorities discovered an arsenal of weapons and a videotape that gave detailed instructions on the method for extracting ricin from castor beans. Ricin was also part of a plot by four men from Minnesota who were part of the tax-protesting militia known as the Minnesota Patriot’s Council, whose goal was to overthrow the government. In 1991, the group had planned to use ricin to kill a deputy U.S. marshal and a sheriff who had served court orders on members of the group. The amount of ricin the group had manufactured could have killed 100 people if it had been deployed effectively. The four men were the first to be tried, and, in 1995, convicted, under the 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-terrorism Act for possessing ricin.

While ricin has been the choice for some domestic extremists, it hasn’t been the only one. Demetrius “Van” Crocker was sentenced to 30 years in prison in November 2006 after having been convicted of attempting to obtain chemical weapons, in this case deadly...
sarin gas, and for possession of stolen explosives. A former member of the right-wing National Socialist Movement, Crocker’s objective was to build a dirty bomb and use it to destroy a state or federal court house. A white supremacist, William Krar, was arrested by the FBI in 2003. At the time of his arrest, Krar had approximately two pounds of sodium cyanide, which, when mixed with acids or other substances, creates hydrogen cyanide, a gas that is lethal in small amounts. He also had 65 pipe bombs, several remote-controlled briefcase bombs, and over 500,000 rounds of ammunition.

In 2000, animal rights extremists placed a similar cyanide-based chemical in a McDonald’s restaurant in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in conjunction with protests at an animal genetics convention. Three militia members were arrested in December 1999 before they could carry out a plan to destroy a 24-million-gallon propane facility in Elk Grove, California, near Sacramento. At the time of their arrest, the subjects were in possession of bomb-making equipment, including detonation cord and blasting caps. In this regard, it is instructive to note that the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore Laboratory found that had this attack taken place as planned, it “would likely have resulted in a firestorm that could have reached as far out as fourteen kilometers from the site and could have caused a fatality rate as high as fifty percent up to five miles away.” A similar plot occurred in 1997 when four members of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan from Wise County, Texas, were arrested for planning an elaborate scheme to rob an armored car. Part of their plan involved a diversionary bombing at the Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation’s natural gas processing and storage facility. The plotters believed that the resulting explosions could have caused so many deaths that it would take law enforcement authorities “three or four days” to remove the casualties.

Congruent with some domestic terrorists’ desire to employ chemical, biological or radiological devices, the examples cited above also illustrate the fact that, as with most international terrorist groups, domestic terrorists exhibit the same propensity to direct their attacks against “soft” civilian targets. The plot against the Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation facility exemplifies the same disregard many domestic terrorists have for those who are killed or injured by their activity as do international groups. One of the plotters, Catherine Dee Adams, was caught on an FBI videotape discussing the possibility that children near the facility might die as a result of their actions. She is heard saying, “There’s a few kids right there, but hopefully they’ll be in school. I hate to say this, but if it has to be, it has to be.” Adams’s husband commented on the mass casualties he expected by saying that law enforcement and firefighting personnel would be kept busy for days. Timothy McVeigh, the convicted Oklahoma City bomber, expressed similar disregard for children when he was asked about the 19 children among the 168 who died in his attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. He described their deaths as “collateral damage.”

The 9/11 attacks, the bombings of the subways in London and Madrid, and continued warning that al-Qa’ida remains interested in targeting critical infrastructure in order
to inflict large numbers of casualties resulted in a tremendous allocation of resources aimed at protecting our critical infrastructure. Transportation links, water supply systems, and electrical grid and telecommunications networks remain critical nodes, and because they are largely unprotected, they remain vulnerable to terrorist attack. However, international terrorists are not the first to set their sights on infrastructure. Animal rights and environmental extremists who believe that many types of infrastructure are harmful to animals and the environment have targeted infrastructure repeatedly and with some success. For example, in 1989 four members of a domestic environmental extremist group, the Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC), were charged in relation to a plot to destroy power lines which comprised part of the infrastructure of four nuclear facilities in three states. The group targeted lines leading to the Central Arizona Project and Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stations located in Arizona, the Diablo Canyon facility in California, and Colorado’s Rocky Flats facility. A fifth person was subsequently indicted on charges of destruction of a nuclear facility.

Those convictions notwithstanding, power lines and other infrastructure remain viable targets for animal rights and environmental extremists. Recent examples demonstrate this predilection. On 25 January 2006, three environmental extremists, Eric McDavid, Zachary Jenson, and Lauren Weiner, were indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice for conspiracy to damage and destroy property by fire and an explosive. Specifically, the individuals had targeted cellular telephone towers, electrical power stations, a dam, a fish hatchery, and a government building. The group had conducted preoperational surveillance on the targets, purchased the ingredients necessary for the explosive device, and began to manufacture the chemicals to be used for the explosive. Similarly, in January 2006, 11 defendants were charged with acts of domestic terrorism undertaken on behalf of the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front that caused a total of $80 million in damage. The indictment charges that these individuals conducted a multitude of crimes from 1996 to 2001, including the destruction of a high-tension power line near Bend, Oregon, that serves the Bonneville Power Administration energy facility.

Environmental and animal rights extremists are not alone among domestic extremists in targeting infrastructure. In 2000, Leo Felton, a member of a gang called Aryan Unit One, discussed bombing the New England Holocaust Memorial in Boston and the Leonard P. Zakim Bridge, which connects Boston to Cambridge, Massachusetts. Subsequent to his arrest, a search of his apartment found bomb-making materials and 28 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, a precursor used to make explosives. Earlier, in 1995, an Amtrak train derailed in rural Hyder, Arizona, killing one passenger and injuring others. Though unsolved, the FBI describes this act as a suspected terrorism incident. An analysis of the note claiming credit for the derailment, which was signed by the “Sons of Gestapo,” indicates that the perpetrators were associated with a domestic right-wing ideology.

**POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE MISPERCEPTION**

As evidenced from the domestic terrorist activity highlighted above, it is a mistake to think that domestic terrorists are any less capable or violent than international groups. Despite domestic terrorists’ demonstrated history of attacking the same and similar
targets as international terrorists, with the same force and disregard for human life, it appears that their actions do not attract the same concern as international terrorism. While it is difficult to quantify perceptions about the differences in dangerousness between domestic and international terrorists, several factors can be used to illustrate that there appears to be a distinct presumption that international terrorists are more nefarious than domestic ones. Evidence from public policy and scholarly research supports this contention.

The perception that domestic terrorism is less lethal is likely perpetuated, in part, due to the bureaucratic composition of the agencies assigned to combat terrorism. The Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency receive the lion’s share of intelligence funding, personnel, and other antiterrorism resources, which strongly influences how the terrorist threat is perceived. Because those agencies are precluded by statute, with minor exceptions, from investigating domestic terrorists, they do not have the proverbial dog in the domestic terrorism fight. Thus, investigating domestic terrorism is left largely to the FBI and to state and local law enforcement even when domestic terrorists target Pentagon assets in the United States.

In turn, because the bulk of those assigned to a counterterrorism role within the government are mainly concerned with international terrorism, it is logical that, given the interplay between academics and government policy, a majority of the research on terrorism focuses attention on international groups and their actions. It is not surprising then that since 2001, the main thrust of academic research and publishing on terrorism has focused almost exclusively on the phenomenon’s international aspects. One only has to conduct a cursory examination of the literature to find that the scholarly community has responded, like moths to a flame, by publishing a host of journal articles and monographs that describe international terrorist groups and Islamic extremism and seek to quantify the strategic threat posed by al-Qa’ida. Significant attention has also been given to the terrorist recruitment process, suicide terrorism, terrorist motivation, the evolution of international Islamic jihad, and recommendations as to how the global war on terror should be waged.

Two journals, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Political Violence, are widely recognized as the main publishing venues for scholarly articles on the topic of politically motivated violence. A review of articles published in these two journals since 2001 reveals few articles that examine or address an aspect of domestic terrorism. From January 2001 through January 2007, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism contained over 187 articles on an eclectic range of themes. Yet only three of these had as their focus domestic terrorist groups or U.S. extremism. Similarly, Terrorism and Political Violence published 189 articles, the overwhelming majority of which centered upon terrorism’s international aspects. Six explored recent activity by U.S. domestic groups. We note that, despite the publication of excellent works by noted terrorism experts, few monographs or doctoral dissertations exploring domestic terrorism have been published since 2001. Even in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, which at the time was by far the largest attack against the United States and one of the largest worldwide, scholars showed little interest in domestic terrorism. Finally, many of the Internet Web sites that
provide background on terrorist groups, biographies of key leaders, terrorist incidents, and terrorist modi operandi focus almost exclusively on international terrorism.49

Mirroring the academic focus on international terrorism, the post-9/11 wide-ranging public debate focused exclusively on methods to prevent, deter, and disrupt international terrorist groups. Domestic terrorism prevention has been almost uniformly left out of this debate. Even though terrorism is a focal point of the nation’s overall National Security Strategy, the global war on terror does not seem to include domestic groups. In fact, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America and The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America make no mention of domestic groups and are focused exclusively on external threats.50

Domestic terrorism’s exclusion from these strategies is most certainly deliberate and not born out of ignorance. Undoubtedly, Congress and others involved in the legislative process are keenly aware of the threat posed by domestic terrorism. The FBI, the federal agency that is statutorily empowered to investigate both domestic and international terrorism within the United States and international terrorism outside of it, is consistent in its frequent testimony before Congress that domestic terrorists and international terrorists are of equal concern to the FBI.51 In particular, FBI testimony appears to take pains to highlight the past use of WMD by domestic terrorists and note that their lethal intentions are effectively no different than international terrorists’. Nonetheless, the United States Congress, the United States Department of Justice, and other policy makers have purposefully made only minor changes to the policies that govern domestic antiterrorism efforts. Only insignificant changes were made post-9/11, chiefly because the largely unchanged policies that were implemented in the 1970s have demonstrated that they strike the appropriate balance between liberty and security. While there is an overwhelming consensus in Congress and within the Department of Justice that the current policies are appropriate and reflective of a measured balance between liberty and security, it is possible that the apparent effect of U.S. laws and policies that make distinctions between international and domestic terrorism reinforces the perception that domestic terrorists are less threatening.

THE PERCEPTION’S IMPACT

Regardless of how the perception came to be that domestic terrorists are less evil minded, the perception matters greatly. Particularly significant is the likelihood that government policies affect how federal, state, and local individuals involved in the counterterrorism effort perceive domestic terrorism. Federal law enforcement agencies rely heavily on state and local law enforcement for spotting suspicious people and activity and assisting with investigations. Should these countless eyes and ears on the street believe that domestic terrorists are not worthy of concern, they, and the large number of those involved in private security, may dismiss the danger. Importantly, domestic terrorists have a consistent history of engaging in fatal acts against law enforcement during routine law-enforcement activity, such as traffic stops. Thus, the perception of domestic terrorism not only affects the gathering of information against domestic terrorist groups, the cornerstone of prevention; it also could result in deadly consequences for
local and state law-enforcement officials who are in constant contact with extremists in their daily activities.

Ultimately, the perception of domestic terrorists as less motivated, capable, and lethal, combined with the nearly one-dimensional focus on foreign threats after 9/11, is creating an imbalance in further understanding the particular characteristics of domestic extremists, as well as possible trajectories as groups evolve, mature, or adjust their raisons d’être to new social and political realities. This imbalance may lead to missed opportunities in identifying strategies, laws, and innovative policing methods aimed at more effectively thwarting domestic extremism. By generally ignoring domestic terrorism as an area worthy of continued academic scholarship, we reduce our chances of developing a comprehensive understanding of what causes individuals and groups to terrorize, what factors may indicate future violence, what factors escalate or de-escalate terrorism, and which punitive or nonpunitive measures are effective in stopping terrorism. All these areas would likely be of keen interest to the federal, state, and local law-enforcement communities as well as to policy makers. Increasing our understanding of domestic terrorism provides the potential for sound and accurate analysis, and may enhance policy makers’ ability to craft more efficient, effective, and innovative policies to deter domestic terrorism.

DOMESTIC TERRORISM: NOT NECESSARILY BOMBS

Domestic terrorism is different from international terrorism because some of the most active groups operating in the United States today do not limit themselves to the blunt instruments of international terrorism. Most international terrorist incidents boil down to killing or injuring people using explosives. Moreover, “martyrdom” as an objective often underpins their motives and planning. Alternatively, domestic terrorists generally want to live to fight another day. They employ a plethora of criminal activity that they believe will enable them to achieve their goals.

In fact, it appears that when domestic terrorist groups use all the tools available to them, from constitutionally protected activity through lethal attacks, their efforts are more effective than the deadly violence associated with international terrorists. Consider that one of al-Qa’ida’s chief objectives in striking the United States was to coerce the United States to remove its military forces and overall influence from the Middle East and the broader Muslim world. Instead, U.S. presence has increased dramatically in Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, McVeigh’s and Nichol’s onetime-spectacular attack did nothing to achieve their goal of engineering a revolution. In contrast, the domestic terrorist groups, especially single-issue ones, that use the full gamut of activity available to them appear to be able to greatly influence the behavior of those they target.

The extreme antiabortion movement, specifically defined as those who employ criminal activity of a terrorist nature, is a prime example of a single-issue group that has effectively utilized a full range of criminal activity in an effort to achieve its goal of stopping abortion. While the movement appears to be declining, and has yet to achieve its ultimate goal, there is strong evidence that its use of constitutionally protected activity, in combination with constant low levels of criminal activity and infrequent lethal violence, is extremely effective in intimidating those who provide abortion-related
services. After the Supreme Court’s 1973 landmark decision that abortion was a constitutional right, a social and political movement formed with the goal of overturning the ruling. By the late 1980s and 1990s, there were large antiabortion demonstrations throughout the country during which individuals simply exercised their First Amendment rights. Then, like other domestic terrorist groups before them, such as the left-wing violence that arose out of the anti–Vietnam War era, a tiny fraction of the broader movement became frustrated at the perceived lack of goal attainment. For a handful of extremists, legitimate political activity would not suffice in stopping abortion. By the early 1990s, after years of escalating criminal activity, violence aimed at preventing individuals from exercising what the Supreme Court considers a constitutional right reached a fever pitch. Moving away from the movement’s fundamental belief that all human life is sacred, extremists contended that killing was justified to save the lives of unborn children. Doctors and their staffs became murder targets. The first murder occurred in 1993 during an antiabortion demonstration outside of a Pensacola, Florida, clinic when an antiabortion extremist murdered Dr. David Gunn. Dr. Gunn, who had been subjected to years of harassment, threats, and civil disobedience, was the first of seven individuals murdered by extremists. Additionally, there have been 17 attempted murders against clinic personnel. By 1993, a loose coalition of individuals popularized the moniker Army of God to take credit for lethal criminal activity. Some of the most notorious acts the Army of God claimed to have conducted were the bombings by Eric Rudolph at the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, and the subsequent bombings against two abortion clinics that resulted in two deaths. According to one watchdog group, from 1977 through 2004 there were at least 41 bombings, 171 arsons, and 82 attempted bombings and arsons. Additionally, clinic doctors and their employees have been subject to a wide variety of activity, such as the posting of their photos and personal information on the Internet, placing of noxious chemicals in facilities, surveillance of employees, and sending of hoax WMD letters, among a multitude of other similar activities.

Ultimately, single-issue terrorism appears to have met with a measurable degree of success in this case. While the violent activities were relatively sporadic, the clinic personnel targeted via consistent low-level harassment, threats, and vandalism were the de facto targets of the violent acts due to the notoriety of the violence conducted by extremists. Since the height of terrorist activity against clinics, which took place throughout the 1990s, the number of doctors who perform abortions and the number of places that offer abortion services have declined. While there are many possible reasons for this decline, including changing social views, more restrictive laws governing abortion, and higher medical insurance, among others, those who work at clinics cite fear as one of the factors why fewer doctors and medical support personnel are willing to participate in the delivery of this constitutionally protected medical procedure. Exemplifying this fear, one physician closed his facility in Washington, DC, citing the strain caused by antiabortion extremism. In explaining his decision, he wrote to his patients that “Sadly, the ongoing threat to my life and my concern for the safety of my loved ones has extracted a heavy toll on me, making it necessary that I discontinue practicing OB-GYN.”

Like the antiabortion movement, the extreme animal rights and environmental movements utilize a multitude of tactics aimed at achieving their goal of preventing...
perceived abuses of animals or causing harm to the environment. The movements, which are often indiscernible from each other, have coalesced with the burgeoning anarchist movement, and are currently active throughout the nation. Their illegal activity is a prominent focus of FBI attention. Considered single-issue movements, they also have achieved an extraordinary degree of success by using the entire spectrum of activity available to domestic terrorists. Individuals associated with these movements often utilize the names Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front when conducting activity aimed at preventing the abuse of animals and harm to the environment. Since 1996, the FBI estimates that ELF, ALF, and related extremist groups engaged in approximately 1,100 criminal acts causing over $100 million in damage.55

One of the most formalized animal rights groups operating today is Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). Its goal is to force Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), a company that conducts drug and product testing, out of business. While the SHAC campaign frequently utilizes constitutionally protected activity to accomplish its objective, it also uses a host of illegal methods. The most egregious illegal activities associated with SHAC were the bombings of two of its targets. In 2003, the Chiron Corporation and Shaklee Corporation, both located in California, were targeted because of their associations with HLS. A group calling itself the Revolutionary Cells of the Animal Liberation Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack, and in a prepared statement claimed, “We gave all of the customers the chance, the choice, to withdraw their business from HLS. Now you will reap what you have sown. All customers and their families are considered legitimate targets. . . . [N]o more will all the killing be done by the oppressors, now the oppressed will strike back.”56 A federal arrest warrant was issued for the alleged perpetrator, Daniel Andreas San Diego. San Diego, currently a fugitive, was active in the animal rights movement.

The more nuanced terrorist activity done on behalf of SHAC comes in the form of criminal harassment, stalking, and other crimes intended to intimidate and coerce employees and companies associated with animal testing or other individuals associated with HLS and associated targets. For example, in 2006, after a long FBI investigation the group and six of its members were convicted of violating the Animal Enterprise Protection Act and interstate stalking.57 Four of its members were charged with telephone harassment. One employee of an insurance company associated with HLS testified that personal information about her and her family was posted on SHAC’s Web site, including, among other information, her name, the name of her seven-year-old son, and the fact that her son sang in a boys choir.58 The woman testified that she received an e-mail threatening to fill her son with poison and slice her son, “the way Huntingdon does with animals.” Another person testified that SHAC broke all of the windows of his home and overturned his wife’s car.59

The SHAC campaign has undoubtedly been successful. The insurance company that employed the woman threatened by SHAC chose to cut its business dealings with HLS. Likewise, more than 100 companies targeted by SHAC because of their associations with HLS have stopped conducting business with the company, including Aetna Insurance, Citibank, Deloitte and Touche, Johnson and Johnson, and Merck.60 SHAC’s success comes from its use of the wide range of activity it employs. To reiterate, it is apparent
that even nonlethal or low-level criminal activity has the effect of creating a coercive environment. Those targeted by SHAC are well aware that the group has utilized bombings and other tactics to instill fear. The movement also does not hide the fact that one of the movement’s well-known leaders contends that killing individuals associated with animal research is a legitimate tactic. Dr. Jerry Vlasak, an emergency room doctor, testified before the Senate in 2005 in a hearing on SHAC that he stood by an earlier statement advocating the murder of animal researchers in which he said, “I don’t think you’d have to kill too many. I think five lives, ten lives, fifteen human lives, we could save a million, two million or ten million nonhuman lives.” Clearly the extremist animal rights movement is evolving in a pattern similar to that of the antiabortion movement. Some members perceive that they are having difficulty achieving their social and political goals via the democratic process. Consequently, they become frustrated. In turn, they modify their original ideological stances and become willing to use criminal activity to achieve their goals. The animal rights movement initially contended that all living beings, both humans and animals, must be protected. Now, it appears that the ideology of some in the movement has evolved to the point where they embrace the view of Dr. Vlasak.

DOMESTIC TERRORISM—NOT DOWN, NOT OUT

As we have illustrated above, domestic terrorists have not faded into the twilight. Domestic terrorists have been as motivated and are as capable of conducting attacks and engaging in other criminal activity as international terrorists. Simply because domestic terrorists have not conducted a single mass-casualty attack on the scale of 9/11 is no reason to ignore them or view their actions as having minimal impact on American civil society. The political and social issues that have motivated diverse groups of extremists have not been resolved to their satisfactions. Globalization, abortion, animal rights, deeply held concerns about the environment, racism, immigration policies, and fear of an overly powerful government are some of the issues that continue to spawn small cadres of people who willingly engage in violent activity in order to achieve their political or social objectives. The nation should not be lulled into a false sense of complacency regarding domestic terrorist groups, nor should we be surprised at continued criminal and violent activity undertaken by such groups.

NOTES

The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, or the U.S. government.

1. Terrorism has many definitions. For this chapter we use the FBI’s, which defines domestic terrorism as activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population and to influence the policy of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Domestic terrorist groups have no support from or connections to foreign governments or organizations. International terrorism involves the territory or citizens of more than one country. The term “homegrown terrorism” is being used increasingly to describe groups or individuals who are inspired by al-Qa’ida and other radical Islamist ideologues. Single-issue terrorism may be defined as extremist militancy on the part of groups or individuals protesting a perceived grievance or wrong usually attributed to government action or inaction. Three issues generally fall under the definition: animal rights,

2. The heavily weighted focus on international terrorism is understandable given that al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders, Usama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, survived the U.S. military campaign to capture or kill them. Though their ability to plan and direct terrorist attacks has been severely degraded, they remain powerful symbols for those Islamic radicals who oppose U.S. policies and who seek to kill Americans. There is extensive debate about whether these groups “hate us” because of “who we are” versus “what we do.” For an excellent overview of the various schools of thought regarding al-Qa’ida’s motivations, see Max Abrams, “Al Qaeda’s Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda’s Objectives,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 5 (July/August 2006): 509–29.

3. Al-Qa’ida has evolved into a global movement comprised of Islamic radicals. Despite the loss of senior operatives and the favorable training environment in Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida continues to recruit and inspire an undetermined number of new operatives, who have in turn mounted successful attacks in Western Europe, in Southeast Asia, and in the Middle East. Perhaps the most ominous, in terms of illustrating al-Qa’ida’s continued interest in conducting mass-casualty attacks, was the attempt in August 2006 to destroy multiple aircraft in flight over the Atlantic Ocean. This plot was adroitly thwarted by the British law-enforcement and intelligence services. There are, of course, a series of well-known post-9/11 attacks that have been conducted by al-Qa’ida or its affiliates. The Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiya detonated a suicide car bomb at a Bali nightclub on 12 October 2002, killing over 200 people. On 16 May 2003 five bombs exploded at various targets in Casablanca, killing 45 people. Spanish authorities identified the Moroccan Combatant Group, an al-Qa’ida ally, as being a prime suspect for the attack. The Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigade and Secret Organization of Al-Qa’ida in Europe claimed credit for attacking the Madrid train station on 11 March 2004 and London subway system on 7 July 2005. In Madrid, nearly 200 people were killed and over 1,200 injured. The suicide bombings in London killed 56 people and wounded 700 more.


6. Partly because the Senate had adjourned earlier than normal for the day on 7 November 1983, no one was injured. Additional details are available at www senate.gov/artandhistory/minute/bomb_explodes_in_capitol.htm.


8. In this brief chapter we do not attempt an exhaustive survey of activity by domestic terrorists. Instead, we provide some representative actions undertaken by a diverse array of groups and individuals.

9. See the FBI’s “Project Megiddo,” reproduced in its entirety in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 27–52.


20. Sarin came to prominence after the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo used it in the Tokyo subway in 1995.


28. Parks, “3 Suspected in KKK Plot Ordered Held without Bond.”


30. We consider the 23 October 1983 attack in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. Marines an attack against a military, versus civilian, target.

31. Michael Poulin, a self-described anarchist, sabotaged electrical transmission towers in Klamath Falls, Oregon, and Anderson, California. Interestingly, Poulin claimed to have been attempting to demonstrate the grid’s lack of security.


37. The authors of this chapter have been directly involved with providing antiterrorism training to state and local law-enforcement agencies under the SLATT (state and local antiterrorism training) program. During training sessions, we emphasize that the threat of domestic terrorism has not disappeared. With the establishment of fusion centers in each state, there is an opportunity for additional resources—both investigative and analytical—to be devoted to addressing domestic extremist activity.

38. Research establishes that domestic terror organizations see the military as a source of training, weapons, and explosives. Investigations demonstrate that terrorist and antigovernment movements welcome members with military experience. Additionally, extremist group members have entered the armed forces explicitly to obtain training and access to explosives. As a result, the military criminal investigative organizations (Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Army Criminal Investigative Division) aggressively work jointly with the FBI to uncover, neutralize, and prosecute these cases.

39. *Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2004); and *Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda*.


Analysis of Right Wing Domestic Terrorism in the United States (1995–2001)” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002); David C. Lobb, “An Ivory Tower of Fear: Academics of the Racist Right” (PhD diss., Syracuse University, 2001); and George J. Michael, “The United States Response to Domestic Right Wing Terrorism and Extremism: A Government and NGO Partnership” (PhD diss., George Mason University, 2001). Interestingly, none centered upon left-wing or single-issue groups despite FBI congressional testimony since 2001 stating that some of these groups continue to operate in the United States and engage in a wide range of criminal activity.


49. There are myriad Web sites focused upon the terrorist phenomenon. Two that we consider useful for researchers and students are the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, www.tkb.org, and the Terrorism Research Center, www.terrorism.com.

50. In the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror, the enemy is described as a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and nonstate supporters—that have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. The al-Qa’ida Associated Movement (AQAM), comprised of al-Qa’ida and affiliated extremists, is the most dangerous present manifestation of such extremism.


53. Ibid.


55. U.S. Department of Justice, “Eco-terror Indictments.”

56. Lewis, “Investigating and Preventing Animal Rights Extremism.”


59. Ibid.

60. Lewis, “Investigating and Preventing Animal Rights Extremism.”